Why We Need to Rethink CEO Compensation Practices
A
2018 report by The Wall Street Journal showed
that in 2017 a quarter of CEOs among the 133 largest U.S. firms saw their pay
go up by approximately 25%. The average increase for the entire sample was
around 10%. In sharp contrast, wages for employees at the same firms barely
showed an increase. This obvious disparity in wage increases prompts a re-examination
of that age old, much-debated question: do CEOs deserve the pay they receive? According
to a recent study by
Herman
Aguinis, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Geoffrey P. Martin, Harry Joo, and Ernest O’Boyle, many don’t.
Many
people argue that CEOs are overpaid and their high salaries are not justified,
especially as CEO pay continues to increase in comparison with wage increases
for everyone else. How does this position compare with the economic reality? To understand if CEOs really deserve their
compensation packages, we need to understand how CEO pay and performance are
linked and analyse CEO pay and CEO performance data. Are some CEOs paid vastly more than the rest? Do some CEOs vastly outperform the rest? And
how much do these two groups overlap?
To
get to the heart of these questions, we used a novel and precise methodological
approach to understand the distribution of CEO pay and CEO performance across
our CEO sample. We analysed the pay and performance of over 4,000 CEOs from
publicly traded firms across 22 industries, including agriculture, forestry,
mining, air travel, banking; and basic manufacturing. Our results on both CEO pay
and performance looked like the “power law” distribution shown in Figure 1,
with many CEOs all the way to the right of the distribution – to the right of
mean pay and mean performance. However, to the left of the distribution, some
CEOs exhibit extreme pay and extreme performance values. This is in comparison
to a “normal” bell curve distribution, where most scores cluster around the
middle. This demonstrates that the highest paid CEOs are paid multiple times
more than the rest of the CEO cohort, and the highest performing CEOs
outperform the rest by a large margin.
Figure 1: the distribution of CEO pay
and performance
But here is our most important finding.
When we examined the CEO pay and CEO performance distributions side by side, we
found little overlap between top earners and top performers. None of the top 1% performing CEOs are
among the top 1% paid CEOs regarding salary or bonus. Only 5% of the top 5%
performing CEOs are also among the top 5% paid CEOs and only 20% of the top 5%
performing CEOs are also among the top 5% paid CEOs. These results indicate that (1) CEOs at the
top of the performance distribution create vastly more value than those at
succeedingly lower levels of the performance distribution; (2) CEOs at the top
of the pay distribution are remunerated far more than those at succeedingly
lower levels of the pay distribution; and (3) there is minimal overlap between
the CEO pay and CEO performance power law distributions; because of the power
law distributions shown above, the extent of the mismatch is amplified.
In other words, the CEOs who create disproportionately
large amounts of value are in a different
group from the CEOs receiving disproportionately large amounts of
compensation, and vice versa. These results hold across all pay components
(base salary, bonuses, and long term income) and almost all industries.
What implications does our research have for executive
compensation, governance, and HR practices? A typical approach many companies
follow for negotiating and designing CEO compensation contracts is for the
board’s pay committee (usually with the help of compensation consultants) to
ascertain the average CEO pay for a particular performance cohort in a given
industry. The committee then uses that figure as a reference to estimate CEO
capability relative to their peer group and sets CEO pay accordingly. However,
as we have shown, CEO pay does not have a normal distribution. There is a huge
range in CEO performance, with those in the top quartile delivering results
many multiples better than the average. This approach to CEO compensation based
on averages results in significantly underpaid CEO stars and overpaid average
performers. No wonder CEO poaching is a frequent phenomenon and the typical CEO
lasts just a few years on the job. After all, information on CEO performance is
readily accessible to recruiters and headhunters, making it easy to identify
the individuals producing top results.
Professional thinking needs to shift towards the power
law view. Headhunting firms that adopt
the power law view, rather than a normal distribution mindset, will be able to
identify CEOs who are not the highest earners but are among the top
performers. Headhunters will be able to
proactively approach these CEOs and tempt them with an offer to move to another
firm. Similarly, firms should examine CEO pay and CEO performance based on a
power law perspective to prevent dysfunctional turnover (i.e., the departure of
a high performing CEO). From a public relations perspective, our results
suggest that firms who embrace a power law mindset can better anticipate and
prevent potential shareholder disapproval and unwanted media attention. Just as
important as identifying top performing CEOs is identifying top earning CEOs
who are not creating commensurate results.
This
blog post is based on the authors' research, which originally appeared in Management Research and
is published under a CC
BY-NC-ND 2.0 license.
If
you would like to explore this issue further, the following authors have taken
the time to write commentaries published within the
same issue analyzing this new research and discussing its impact: Martin J. Conyon, Donald C. Hambrick, Michael A. Hitt, Katalin Takacs
Haynes, Adam J. Wowak, Michael J. Mannor, Patrick M. Wright, Anthony J. Nyberg,
Robert M. Wiseman, Hadi Faqihi, Albert A. Cannella, Jr., Valerie Sy, Gerald E.
Ledford, Edward E. Lawler, James P. Walsh, B. Joseph White, and Jeffrey R.
Edwards. The issue is available as free access until June 10th. 2018.
About
the authors:
Herman
Aguinis is the Avram Tucker Distinguished Scholar
and Professor of Management at George Washington University School of Business.
His interdisciplinary research addresses human capital acquisition,
development, deployment, and research methods and analysis. He has published
over 140 journal articles, five books and delivered over 300 presentations and
keynote addresses on all continents except Antarctica. He has been elected to
serve on the track for the Presidency of the Academy of Management, the preeminent
professional association for over 21,000 management and organization scholars
including about 21,000 spanning more than 120 countries. Find Herman on twitter
@HermanAguinis,
on LinkedIn or
via e-mail.
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia is Regents
Professor and Weatherup/Overby Chair of Management at Arizona State University. He has been named in several studies
as one of the top management scholars in the world and published over 200 articles
and 15 books in management. His recent research interests concern strategic
decision making with a particular focus on family firms. In 2015, he was
listed in Thomson Reuters Highly Cited Researchers, ranking in the top 1% of
researchers in economics and business worldwide.
Geoffrey
P. Martin is an associate professor of strategy at the Melbourne
Business School. Prior to completing his PhD at IE Business School in Madrid
and his MBA at Melbourne Business School, Geoff held a number of senior
strategy and operational risk positions at Deloitte, GT Global, TXU, IAMCO, Egg
Bank and Credit Suisse, where he was Vice President. His research interests
cover strategic decision making, executive compensation, executive risk taking
and corporate governance.
Ernest
O’Boyle is
an associate professor of management and organizations at the Tippie College
Business, University of Iowa. His research interests include star performance,
counterproductive work behaviour, research methods, and ethical issues
surrounding publication practices. He is the recipient of the Academy of
Management Early Career Awards for both the Research Methods Division and Human
Resources Division.
Harry
Joo is
an assistant professor at the School of Business Administration, University of
Dayton. His research interests include star/high performers, research methods,
and bridging the science-practice divide.
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